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MARRIED COUPLE, SINGLE RECIPIENT:
UNDERSTANDING THE EXCLUSION OF
GIFTS AND INHERITANCES
FROM DEFAULT MATRIMONIAL
REGIMES
Laura Cárdenas
In most Canadian jurisdictions, default family property law
regimes exclude gifts and inheritances from the property
that will be divided between divorcing couples. In Quebec,
this exclusion is not only present in the default regime (the
partnership of acquests) but rendered mandatory by the
public order nature of the “family patrimony”—a
construct determining the property that will be shared
equally between spouses upon their divorce. This article
examines default regimes of family property in Ontario and
Quebec and analyzes the justifications provided by the
provincial legislators for excluding gifts and inheritances
from the mass of assets that will be divided between the
spouses. The article then traces the various ways in which
gifts and inheritances, both within and outside the couple,
have been restricted through Roman, civil, and common
law, and finds that these restrictions are tied to a desire to
maintain property within the spouses’ natal families.
Finally, the article argues that the exclusion of gifts and
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inheritances points to a conception of the family tied not to
marriage and choice, but to “family” understood as
bloodlines, which is out of step with today’s contemporary
values and betrays the portrait of marriage otherwise
painted in family property legislation.
INTRODUCTION
Upon divorce, legal separation, or death, 1 separating
spouses or their successors must go through the difficult
process of separating their assets. The rules for dividing
assets are set out either in the couple’s marriage contract
(when applicable) or by the default matrimonial regime of
the jurisdiction in which the couple first domiciled. 2 In
Quebec, the default matrimonial regime (the partnership of
acquests) supplements the “family patrimony”—a
construct of public order that lists specific kinds of
property to be shared equally between spouses upon their
divorce. 3 In Canada, matrimonial regimes fall under the

1

Among other circumstances. For an exhaustive list of circumstances
that will bring matrimonial regimes to an end, see e.g. arts 417, 465
CCQ; Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 5 [Ontario FLA].

2

But note that the public order provisions of the family patrimony apply
only to couples who are Quebec residents at the time they file for
divorce, separation, or at the time of their death (see arts 391, 3089
CCQ; Michel Tétrault, Droit de la famille, 4th ed, vol 1 (Cowansville,
Que: Yvon Blais, 2010) at 156).

3

See arts 414–26 CCQ (family patrimony); arts 448–84 CCQ (regime
of acquests). See also art 391 CCQ (public order nature of the family
patrimony); art 432 CCQ (default nature of the partnership of
acquests); Droit de la famille – 08316, 2008 QCCA 285, [2008] RDF
25 at para 17.
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jurisdiction of the provinces, 4 most of which displaced
common law provisions on family property through
legislative reforms in the 1970s–1990s. Despite important
differences between some of these regimes, in particular
between the civilian regime of Quebec and the common
law regimes, the basic organisational structure of default
matrimonial regimes is the same: it is determined that a
core mass of assets belongs to both spouses together and as
such must be shared between them upon the end of the
marriage, while other assets belong to the spouses
individually and are thus excluded from the shared mass of
assets. 5 Gifts and inheritances are consistently found
among these excluded assets. In this article, we analyze the
justifications for this exclusion provided or implied in
reports published during the reform of matrimonial
regimes, using mainly Quebec and Ontario as examples
(Part I). We then trace the various ways in which gifts and
inheritances within and outside the couple have been
restricted through Roman, civil, and common law and find
that these restrictions are tied to a desire to maintain
property within the spouses’ natal families (Part II).
Finally, we argue that the exclusion of gifts and
inheritances points to a conception of the family tied not to
marriage and choice, but to “family” as bloodlines, which
is out of step with today’s contemporary values and betrays
the portrait of marriage otherwise painted in family
property legislation (Part III).
This article refers to legislation on “family property
law”, but the definition of who constitutes a “family” for
4

See Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(13), reprinted
in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.

5

See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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the purposes of this legislation is dependent on the
jurisdiction. The provincial and territorial acts on family
property, and the provisions of the Civil Code of Québec,
were all drafted with married couples in mind. Quebec’s
provisions on the family patrimony and the partnership of
acquests also apply to couples joined in a civil union,6 but
do not apply to de facto (or “common law”) spouses.7 By
way of contrast, British Columbia considers de facto
spouses as a married couple for the purpose of its Family
Law Act.8 This article refers to “spouses,” meaning thereby
any couple to whom the relevant property division regime
applies.
While this article focuses only on couples to whom
a property division regime applies, our purpose is
nonetheless to uncover something about the way our
legislators consider the family more broadly: is the
language of our legislation and its structure conceiving of
the couple as a unit, or as a set of individuals, or as the
temporary or permanent joining of two separate families?
The answer to this question may be just as relevant for de
facto spouses (or for other types of families that do not
conform to traditional social norms) as it is for married
ones. At a time where the rate of divorces remains stable
but the average duration of marriages keeps decreasing,9
6

See art 521.6 al 4 CCQ.

7

See Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 SCR 61
(commonly known as Eric v Lola).

8

See Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 3(1)(b) [British Columbia
FLA].

9

See Statistics Canada, Marital Status: Overview, 2011, by Anne Milan,
Catalogue No 91-209-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, July 2013) at 11,
Table 2 and 12, Table 3. See also Statistics Canada, Families, Living
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where non-traditional families gain in social acceptance
and are increasingly the subject of studies, and where
couples are thus re-defining the meaning of marriage and
family for themselves and for society, questions about the
way legislators define and conceive of the “family” gain in
importance, as do the reasons for the division of property
upon the end of a marriage or other stable relationship.
I. GIFTS AND INHERITANCES IN CANADIAN
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES IN THE 19TH AND
20TH CENTURIES
In this Part, we first outline the conceptual way in which
today’s Canadian matrimonial regimes conceive of the
couple’s property and the way it should be divided (Part IA), before providing an overview of the rules that were in
place before these regimes and contextualizing the reforms
that gave rise to them (Part I-B). This Part will then turn to
the justifications that were provided at the time of the
reforms for the exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the
shared mass of assets (Part I-C).
A. Exclusion of Gifts and Inheritances in Current
Matrimonial Regimes
All Canadian provinces and territories have, through
legislation, put into place default regimes for the division
of family property at the end of a marriage. In common law
provinces, common law rules were displaced by provincial

Arrangements and Unpaid Work, by Anne Milan, Leslie-Anne Keown
& Covadonga Robles Urquijo, Catalogue No 89-503-X (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, December 2011) at 16.
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and territorial statutes starting in the 1970s, 10 and have
been subject to modifications and sometimes broader
reforms since. 11 In Quebec, matrimonial regimes have
been present since the reception of the Coutume de Paris
in 1664,12 and were most recently modified in 1989 with
the incorporation of the family patrimony as a public order
overarching component of all matrimonial regimes.13
The default regimes in these statutes all adhere to
the same basic organizational structure, which can be
conceptualized as follows: before their marriage, each
spouse-to-be owns a basket of individual property; there
are thus two baskets, each belonging to one of the spouses
and containing their individual property. At the end of the
marriage, there are three baskets: the spouses each own
their individual basket, and share together a third basket
containing the property that ought to be divided between
them—what we have referred to above as a shared mass of
assets. Given that the spouses have presumably shared their
property with each other during the marriage, as well as
10

The first such legislation was Ontario’s Family Law Reform Act, RSO
1980, c 152.

11

See e.g. Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, Division of Family
Property: Discussion Paper (Halifax: LRCNS, 2016).

12

See Yves F Zoltvany, “Esquisse de la coutume de Paris” (1971) 25:3
Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française 365 at 368; Michel Morin,
“La réception de l’ancien droit et du nouveau droit français au BasCanada, 1774-1866” in H Patrick Glenn, ed, Droit québécois et droit
français : communauté, autonomie, concordance (Cowansville, Que:
Yvon Blais, 1993) at 3.

13

See An Act to amend the Civil Code of Québec and other legislation in
order to favour economic equality between spouses, SQ 1989, c 55 [An
Act to favour economic equality between spouses].
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purchased new assets together, the classification of their
assets into the various baskets can present a challenge. The
primary purpose of matrimonial regimes is to classify the
property into these different baskets, according to the rules
of the regime. The shared basket, or shared mass of assets,
bears different names depending on the regime and the
statute—Ontario’s Family Law Act terms it “net family
property”, 14 British Columbia’s Family Law Act refers
simply to “family property”, 15 whereas others refer to it as
“family assets”16 or “matrimonial assets”,17 and Quebec’s
default regime under the Civil Code of Québec
conceptualizes this shared core of assets as a combination
of acquests and the family patrimony.18 Once the contents
of this shared basket have been ascertained, the regime will
also determine the way in which it will be divided between
the spouses and join their individual baskets, and the
considerations upon which this division can be departed
from. 19 Since this article will be focusing on the shared
basket of property across various jurisdictions, we will use
the terminology of “shared mass of assets” for consistency
when referring to this concept across jurisdictions.

14

See Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(1).

15

See British Columbia FLA, supra note 8, s 84.

16

See e.g. Family Property Act, CCSM, c F25, s 1 [Manitoba FPA];
Family Property and Support Act, RSY 2002, c 83, s 4 [Yukon FPSA].

17

See e.g. Family Law Act, RSNL 1990, c F-2, s 18 [Newfoundland and
Labrador FLA].

18

See arts 448–49 CCQ (acquests); arts 414–15 CCQ (family
patrimony).

19

See e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 5; British Columbia FLA, supra
note 8, s 93–97; arts 416, 423, 467, 471 CCQ.

8
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The shared mass of assets is usually composed,
across Canadian jurisdictions, of property acquired during
the marriage by one of the spouses or by both spouses
together, 20 and property used by the family. 21 In some
jurisdictions, the shared mass of assets is defined by listing
the types of property that are excluded from it, rather than
those which are included, but its contents remain generally
the same. 22 In all cases, the legislation sets out a list of
exclusions. The content of this list varies between
jurisdictions, but all of the regimes list gifts and
inheritances made to one spouse by a third party as an
exception to the shared group of assets.23
B. The Place of Gifts and Inheritances in Canadian
Marriage Prior to the Reforms
Until 1851, married women in Canada had no legal
capacity to hold property, as they were subsumed into the
20

See e.g. Newfoundland and Labrador FLA, supra note 17, s 18(1)(c);
The Family Property Act, SS 1997, c F-6.3, s 2 sub verbo “family
property”; Marital Property Act, SNB 2012, c 107, s 1 sub verbo
“marital property” at (b) [New Brunswick MPA]; art 449(1) CCQ.

21

See e.g. New Brunswick MPA, supra note 20, s 1 sub verbis “family
assets”, “marital property” at (a); art 415 al 1 CCQ.

22

See e.g. Family Law Act, SNWT 1997, c 18, s 35 [Northwest
Territories FLA]; Family Law Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-2.1, s 4.

23

For regimes which exclude gifts and inheritances from the shared mass
of assets, see e.g. 415 al 4, 450(2) CCQ; Ontario FLA, supra note 1,
s 4(2); Newfoundland and Labrador FLA, supra note 17, s 18(1)(c)(i);
British Columbia FLA, supra note 8, s 85(1)(b)–(b.1); Manitoba FPA,
supra note 16, s 7(1), 7(3). For regimes that do not exclude gifts and
inheritances outright, but list them as a reason to vary the division of
property awarded to each spouse at the end of the marriage, see e.g.
Yukon FPSA, supra note 16, s 4.
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legal personality of their husband.24 In the common law,
their situation is often described by reference to a quotation
from William Blackstone:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one
person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband: under
whose wing, protection, and cover, she
performs everything; and is therefore called
in our law-french a feme-covert ... and her
condition during her marriage is called her
coverture.25
Due to the “legal disabilities” 26 that made them
unable to hold property, wives’ rights as regards their
property were vested in their husband, who gained the right
to manage and gain profits from the property. 27 This
included the wages gained by the wife if she worked during
the marriage. 28 Wives’ interests in their property were

24

See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Property
Law (Toronto: OLRC, 1993) at 3.

25

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1
(1765) at 442. See also Clara Brett Martin quoted in Constance
Backhouse, “Married Women’s Property Law in Nineteenth-Century
Canada” (1988) 6:2 L & Hist Rev 211 at 212.

26

Alan M Sinclair & Margaret E McCallum, An Introduction to Real
Property Law, 6th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2012) at 119.

27

See Constance Backhouse, supra note 25 at 213.

28

See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 3.
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protected through three types of institutions: coverture,
dower, and curtesy.29
Canadian wives’ first rights to hold property were
granted through a series of provincial reforms that started
in 1851 with New Brunswick’s An Act To Secure to
Married Women Real and Personal Property Held in Their
Own Right. 30 This statute granted wives from New
Brunswick ownership rights over the property they owned
“before or accruing in any way after marriage,” with the
exception of property given to them by their husband
during the marriage. 31 Similar acts followed in Prince
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Vancouver Island in the
1860s. 32 These acts consisted in what Constance
Backhouse terms “marriage breakdown legislation” and
only meant to offer women some solace in cases where
their marriage was imperiled by their husband’s absence.33
They were followed by a wave of “protective legislation”
intended to apply such rights to all married women, and a
third wave of “egalitarian legislation” that finally

29

See Bora Laskin, Cases and Notes on Land Law (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1964) at 70ff.

30

SNB 1851 (14 Vict), c 24 [Married Women Property Act]. See also
Constance Backhouse, supra note 25 at 218.

31

Married Women Property Act, supra note 30, ss 1–2.

32

See An Act to Protect the Rights of Married Women, in Certain Cases,
SPEI 1860 (23 Vict), c 35, ss 1–2 (Prince Edward Island); An Act for
the Protection of Married Women in Certain Cases, SNS 1866 (29
Vict), c 33 (Nova Scotia), ss 1–2; An Act to Protect the Property of a
Wife Deserted by her Husband, SBC 1862 (26 Vict), c 116.

33

See Constance Backhouse, supra note 25 at 217–21.
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challenged the doctrine of marital unity. 34 Once such
statutes passed, the de facto matrimonial regime in each
province and territory became a separate property regime,
whereby property rights remained vested in the spouse with
title to that property.35 There was no shared mass of assets
to include or exclude gifts and inheritances from, and
therefore gifted and inherited property was treated like any
other property.
Quebec wives’ rights were similarly restricted by
their limited legal capacity and the marital authority of
their husbands under the Coutume de Paris36 and the Civil
Code of Lower Canada.37 Their interests were protected
through the civil law dower (douaire). 38 Quebec wives’
legal emancipation was only achieved in 1964, with an act
amending several articles of the Civil Code of Lower
Canada and granting them “full legal capacity as to [their]
34

See ibid at 221, 230. Elements of the second wave were present in New
Brunswick’s Married Women Property Act, supra note 30, and were
central to Ontario’s Married Women's Property Act, SO 1884 (47
Vict), c 19. The third wave was started by Ontario’s 1872 statute An
Act to Extend the Rights of Property of Married Women, SO 1871-71
(35 Vict), c 16.

35

See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 4.

36

See Zoltvany, supra note 12 at 369. See also David Gilles, “La
condition juridique de la femme en Nouvelle-France: essai sur
l'application de la coutume de Paris dans un contexte colonial” [2002]
1 Cahiers aixois d'histoire des droits de l'Outre-mer français 77 at 93.

37

See arts 174–77 CCLC; J Émile Billette, Traité théorique et pratique
de droit civil canadien, vol 1 (Montréal: publisher unknown, 1933) at
144; Gilles, supra note 36 at 81.

38

See Mireille D Castelli, “L’évolution du droit successoral en France et
au Québec” (1973) 14:3 C de D 411 at 445–52.
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civil rights, subject only to such restrictions as arise from
[their] matrimonial regime.”39
Along with the Coutume de Paris, Quebec inherited
a default matrimonial regime from French Law in 1664.
This regime—that of the community of property40—was
carried over to the Civil Code of Lower Canada 41 and
remained the default regime until 1970.42 The community
of property was composed of all the moveables belonging
to the couple (whether obtained before or during the
marriage, purchased or received by the spouses as a gift or
an inheritance), all income from this property, and
immoveables acquired during the marriage. 43 The
community therefore excluded the product of a spouse’s
labour and their immoveables (whether obtained by gift or
inheritance, or owned before the marriage). Gifts and
inheritances of immoveable property by an ascendant were,
however, subject to a presumption that they should not go
to the community of property, but to the donor’s
presumptive heir (the spouse who would have inherited this
39

An Act Respecting the Legal Capacity of Married Women, LQ 1964, c
66, s 1, amending art 177 CCLC. For a brief overview of the major
elements of the evolution of family law since 1964 in Quebec, see
Tétrault, supra note 2 at 15–20.

40

See Zoltvany, supra note 12 at 368.

41

See arts 1271–1367 CCLC, as amended by An Act respecting
matrimonial regimes, SQ 1969, c 77 [Act respecting matrimonial
regimes].

42

See Act respecting matrimonial regimes, supra note 41. See also
art 1271 CCLC, as amended by Act respecting matrimonial regimes,
supra note 41 (setting out the default status of the regime).

43

See art 1272 CCLC, as amended by Act respecting matrimonial
regimes, supra note 41.
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property at the death of the donor44), unless the donor stated
clearly their desire for both spouses to be recipients of the
gift, or for the spouse who was not their presumptive heir
to be the beneficiary of the gift.45 The Civil Code of Lower
Canada’s dispositions on the community of property could
be displaced by entering a marriage contract that would
arrange for the division of property in case of death or
separation. 46 Marriage contracts were commonly entered
to arrange for separation as to property regimes and were
irrevocable.47
After the enactment of federal divorce legislation in
1968,48 consultations were commenced in all common law
jurisdictions to address the impact of divorce on married
spouses, with reforms starting with Ontario’s first statute
on family law (the Family Law Reform Act). 49 These
reforms were motivated by the desire to bring more
44

See Robert P Kouri et al, eds, Private Law Dictionary and Bilingual
Lexicons, 2nd ed (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 1991) sub
verbo “presumptive heir”.

45

See art 1276 CCLC. See also Part II-A-1, below.

46

See art 1260 CCLC, as amended by Act respecting matrimonial
regimes, supra note 41. Note that before 1970, once a marriage had
been celebrated, it was impossible to change regimes (ibid). See also
1257 CCLC.

47

See art 1260 CCLC, as amended by Act respecting matrimonial
regimes, supra note 41; Lionel Smith, “Intestate Succession in
Quebec” in Kenneth GC Reid, Marius J De Waal & Reinhard
Zimmerman, eds, Intestate Succession (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015) 52 at 58.

48

See Divorce Act, SC 1968-69 (16 Eliz II), c 24.

49

Supra note 10 (replacing The Family Law Reform Act, 1978, SO 1978,
c 2).
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equality between spouses upon their divorce and responded
to the grossly unfair results of property division upon the
divorce of women who had given up paying work
opportunities to dedicate themselves to their family or the
family business.50 The statute put in place the foundations
of a regime that valued spouses’ work both outside and
within the home. In Quebec, the partnership of acquests
became the default regime in 1970 51 and the family
patrimony was created in 1989. 52 Both of these reforms
also meant to respond to the inequalities created by the
regime of separation as to property.53 Indeed, wives who
separated or divorced under such a regime after having
spent their married life working in the home—unpaid—
found themselves with little property in their personal

50

See especially Murdoch v Murdoch (1973), [1975] 1 SCR 423, 41 DLR
(3d).

51

See Act respecting matrimonial regimes, supra note 41.

52

See An Act to favour economic equality between spouses, supra
note 13. See also Anne Revillard, “Du droit de la famille aux droits des
femmes : le patrimoine familial au Québec” (2006) 62:1 Dr et soc 95
at 100 (for an overview of the political process leading to the adoption
of the law).

53

See Civil Code Revision Office, Report on Matrimonial Regimes
(Montreal: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1968) at 10; MT v J-YT, 2008
SCC 50 at 16, [2008] 2 SCR 781, Lebel J (describing the family
patrimony as a response to the vulnerability of wives); Christine Morin,
L’émergence des limites à la liberté de tester en droit québécois : étude
socio-juridique de la production du droit (Cowansville, Que: Yvon
Blais, 2009) at 321–27.
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patrimony.54 In 1986, Ontario brought in a new, reformed
Family Law Act.55
Both Ontario reforms and the introduction of the
“net family property” (Ontario’s shared mass of assets)
were claimed to have been influenced by Quebec’s regimes
in their conceptualization of a mass of assets as owned
individually during the marriage, yet re-qualified as either
belonging to one of the spouses, or both, at the time of its
dissolution. This manner of conceptualizing the property—
as a deferred-sharing regime—was said to take inspiration
from the civil law’s approach in the partnership of
acquests.56 On the other side of the border, it was claimed
that the family patrimony was emulating Ontario’s notion
of “family assets”.57 Some authors further claimed that the
qualification of property as part of the family patrimony
due to its purpose (rather than its nature) was incompatible
with the ethos of the civil law, and directly inspired from
the recent Ontario reforms. 58 Quebec’s new notion of
54

See Revillard, supra note 52 at 96; Mireille D Castelli et Dominique
Goubau, Le droit de la famille au Québec, 5th ed (Sainte-Foy: Presses
de l’Université Laval, 2005) at 123–24.

55

Ontario FLA, supra note 1 (replacing the Family Law Act, 1986,
SO 1986, c 4).

56

See Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law: Cases and
Commentary, 2nd ed (Concord, Ont: Captus Press, 2015) at 692.

57

See Danielle Burman, “Politiques législatives québécoises dans
l’aménagement des rapports pécuniaires entre époux : d’une justice
bien pensée à un semblant de justice—un juste sujet de s’alarmer”
(1988) 22:2 RJT 149 at 172. The notion of “family assets” is defined
in s 3(b) of the Family Law Reform Act, supra note 10.

58

See e.g. Burman, supra note 57 at 174–75. See also Nicholas Kasirer,
“Testing the Origins of the Family Patrimony in Everyday Law”
(1995) 36:4 C de D 795 at 822–23 [Kasirer, “Testing the Origins”];
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marriage as a joint economic partnership was also claimed
to have been inspired by notions of Equity. 59 The
conversation between these advances in legislation
between Ontario and Quebec might also serve to explain
the similarity of both regimes in their exclusion of gifts and
inheritances from the shared mass of assets.
C. Today’s Family Law Regimes Promote the Joint
Effort of the Spouses
Neither the Civil Code of Québec, the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, nor the various family property statutes
implemented as a result of the reforms in common law
provinces provide explanations for the exclusion of gifts
and inheritances from the shared mass of assets. The
contemporary legislative debates in common law provinces
are equally silent. 60 The reports and academic articles
commenting on the reform processes in Quebec and
Ontario, however, provide some indications as to why the
exclusions were put into place.

Pierre Ciotola, “Le patrimoine familial et diverses mesures destinées à
favorises l’égalité économique des époux” [1989] 2 CP du N 21 at
para 12 (stating that the legislation that put in place the family
patrimony originated from Anglo-Canadian statutory law and common
law).
59

See Kasirer, “Testing the Origins”, supra note 58 at 797–98. See also
Nicholas Kasirer, “Couvrez cette communauté que je ne saurais voir:
Equity and Fault in the Division of Quebec’s Family Patrimony”
(1994) 25:4 RGD 569 at 584.

60

See e.g. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates
(Hansard), 33-1 (6 June 1985) (Alan Pope), online:
<www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament33/session-1/1985-06-06/hansard> [Hansard Debates (Pope)].
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In reforming the default matrimonial regimes, both
the Civil Code of Lower Canada and the common law
statutes provided a new definition of marriage, centred on
the notion of the family as an economic unit. They
suggested that the division of assets upon divorce is
focused on granting spouses an equal share of the property
they had acquired as participants in the marriage—whether
through the earnings of their paid labour, or the value of
their work within the home. 61 The Ontario statute, in a
formulation that also inspired the Northwest Territories,
equates marriage with “a form of partnership” or an
“economic relationship”.62 While the Civil Code of Lower
Canada and Civil Code of Québec do not contain such a
statement of principle, the law that created the family
patrimony stated that “[t]he object of this bill is to favour
equality between spouses and to underline the character of
marriage as a partnership.”63
The Ontario Law Reform Commission (“the
Commission”), in its 1993 Report on Family Property Law,
61

See Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 5(7); Ontario Law Reform
Commission, supra note 24 at 11; 396 CCQ.

62

Ontario FLA, supra note 1, Preamble; Ontario Law Reform
Commission, supra note 24 at 1, 5. See also Northwest Territories
FLA, supra note 22, Preamble.

63

An Act to favour economic equality between spouses, supra note 13,
Explanatory Notes. See also Burman, supra note 57 at 172, quoting
Suzanne Vadboncœur, ed, Rapport sur la fiscalité, la prestation
compensatoire et le partage des biens familiaux en mariage (Montréal:
Barreau du Quebec, 1987) at 2; MT v J-YT, supra note 53, Lebel J;
Kasirer, “Testing the Origins”, supra note 58 at 803–04 (arguing that
this idea was already present prior to the reforms, although the
language of economic partnership is new); Burman, supra note 57
at 174.
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justified the exclusions listed in subsection 4(2) of the
Family Law Act on the grounds that those assets “are not
the product of the marriage partnership.”64 Since Ontario’s
Family Law Act was meant “to ensure that spouses share
the value of assets accumulated during the marriage,”65 it
seemed logical to the Commission that the types of
property listed in subsection 4(2) (which also include, inter
alia, damages for a personal injury, the proceeds of a life
insurance, and some pensionable earnings) be excluded
from such sharing. In Quebec, authors commenting on the
reforms that created the family patrimony similarly made
reference to the fact that gifts and inheritances do not result
from the work of the spouses towards the marriage.66 The
rationale expressed for the consideration of gifts and
inheritances as private property (rather than acquests) in
the regime of acquests is not as clear, with some authors
simply deciding not to explain the exclusion,67 and others

64

Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 72. See also
Hanoch Dagan & Carolyn J Frantz, “Properties of Marriage” in
Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011) at 219 (“[t]he most common justification given
for treating gifts and inheritances differently is that neither requires
spousal labor. Title to such property is ‘lucrative’ rather than
‘onerous’”).

65

Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 11. See also
Hansard Debates (Pope), supra note 60; Ontario, Legislative
Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 33-1, No 28 (22
October
1985)
(Terry O’Connor),
online:
<www.ola.org/en/legislative-business/house-documents/parliament33/session-1/1985-10-22/hansard-1>.

66

See e.g. Castelli & Goubau, supra note 54 at 131; Tétrault, supra
note 2 at 227–28.

67

See Castelli & Goubau, supra note 54 at 159.
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seeming to state that their “personal value” justifies that
they be considered private property.68
In both the common law and the civil law, while
gifts and inheritances are excluded from the shared mass of
assets, the income from this property is only excluded if the
donor or testator expressly specified that it should be so.69
The provisions that plan for this inclusion suggest that the
work of the spouses is not the only metric that is considered
to justify the classification of property as part of the shared
mass of assets. Indeed, the income arising from the gifted
or inherited property during the marriage could presumably
well be due to the combined efforts of the spouses, yet the
statutes and the Civil Code of Québec only include this
property into the shared mass of assets by default, leaving
the final decision as to the inclusion or exclusion of this
income to the testator or donor. Ontario’s Commission
justifies the importance accorded to the will of the testator
in this decision by pointing out that imposing such a
division may affect the heir’s ability to retain the property
if they have insufficient means to reimburse their divorcing
spouse for half the capital growth or income without selling
the property. 70 In this same discussion, the Commission
also makes reference to the emotional significance of the
property that might be lost due to such a division of the

68

See Tétrault, supra note 2 at 520.

69

See Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2); art 450(2) CCQ (qualifying this
income as an acquest). Compare Alberta’s Matrimonial Property Act,
which includes the increase in value of property received as a gift or
an inheritance in the shared mass of assets (RSA 2000, c M-8, s
7(3)(a)).

70

See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 24 at 73–74.
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increase in value, 71 although this aspect of the loss is
deemed—to the Commission—justifiable in order to
protect the policy considerations that justify dividing this
increase in the first place. 72 The mention of freedom of
testation and personal or sentimental value to justify the
exclusion or inclusion of property into the shared mass of
assets points to a need to balance different legislative
priorities and legal doctrines against the objectives put
forward by the legislative reforms. It also reflects a
potential conflict between the need to maintain coherence
within private law and within the matrimonial regime
itself.
The reforms being justified by a push for greater
equality between spouses and a desire to reward the work
of both spouses in the household, the justification for these
exclusions naturally had to be centred on these same
principles.73 Yet, given the law’s long-standing discomfort

71

See ibid at 77.

72

Such policy considerations mostly refer to the need to ensure
consistency with the way the increase in value/income from the
property is divided in cases of property inherited or received as a gift
prior to marriage (see ibid at 76–77).

73

In Ontario, see ibid at 5–6. See also Susan J Heakes, “Gifting Real
Property to Married Children: The Creation of Legal Fictions to Avoid
Section 4(2) of the Family Law Act” (2006) 25:2 Can Fam LQ 169 at
170 (“[t]here has been no contribution by the spouse to the acquisition
of the gifted home and in ignoring that it has been gifted, the spouse
receives an arguably undeserved windfall in the event of separation or
death”). In Quebec, see Burman, supra note 57 (commenting on the
new family patrimony during the reforms). See also Tétrault, supra
note 2 at 227–28 (“[l]'article 415, al. 4 C.c.Q. prévoit l'exclusion de
biens qui, même s'ils ont une vocation familiale, ne sont pas
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with gifts and inheritances, where transactions seem to
flow only in one direction, without consideration or
return,74 it is not surprising that jurists would be hesitant to
discuss the ways in which the recipient of the gift or
inheritance might have “earned” such generosity. While
the exclusion of gifts and inheritances could have been
justified by prioritizing the will of the testator or donor over
the logic central to the matrimonial regimes, the decision
to justify this exclusion within the framework of the family
property statutes leads to the conclusion that the recipient
must have “earned” the gift or inheritance somehow.
Although gifts and inheritances, as liberalities, consist by
definition of a “transfer, without a counterprestation, of
property to the advantage of another,” 75 it is generally
admitted that gifts are part of a broader network of
exchanges and expectations.76 By this logic, the recipient
would have earned the gift or inheritance through actions
directed to the donor or testator prior to the transfer or
expected to happen after the transfer—acts unrelated to the
transfer itself, but related to the relationship between the
donor or testator and the recipient. Indeed, for the purpose
of legal consistency, only a focus on the relationship
between the parties, rather than the actions that might have
justified the transfer, could support the exclusion. A foray
into the history of gifts and inheritances in married couples
comptabilisés pour le motif qu'ils n'ont pas été acquis en fonction de
l'association économique des époux, donc par leurs efforts”).
74

See Richard Hyland, Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009) at para 6, 8 (“a distrust of gift giving
has often haunted the law” at 6).

75

Kouri et al, supra note 44, sub verbo “liberality” [emphasis added].

76

See Hyland, supra note 74 at 7.
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confirms that relationships play a central role in explaining
this exclusion.
Prior to focusing on the historical treatment of gifts
and inheritances in family contexts, however, we must
address potential counterarguments to our focus on family
relationships as the central determinant of the exclusion of
these gifts and inheritances from the shared mass of assets.
First, gifts and inheritances are not the only types
of property consistently excluded from the shared mass of
assets. Property such as awards for a personal injury,
proceeds of a life insurance, and some pensionable
earnings are also frequently found on the exclusions list in
common law provinces. 77 The motives behind their
exclusion has been the subject of as little discussion as that
of gifts and inheritances, but may seem more intuitive.
Damages for personal injury, for instance, seek to
compensate an individual for a loss that they have suffered
77

For the exclusion of damages, see e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1,
s 4(2)3 (“damages or a right to damages for personal injuries, nervous
shock, mental distress or loss of guidance, care and companionship, or
the part of a settlement that represents those damages”); British
Columbia FLA, supra note 8, s 85(1)(c); Manitoba FPA, supra
note 16, s 8(1); Newfoundland and Labrador FLA, supra note 17,
s 18(1)(c)(ii); Northwest Territories FLA, supra note 22, s 35(2)(b).
For the proceeds of life insurance, see e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1,
s 4(2)4 (“proceeds or a right to proceeds of a policy of life insurance,
as defined under the Insurance Act, that are payable on the death of the
life insured”); Northwest Territories FLA, supra note 22, s 35(1)(c)(ii).
For the exclusion of pensionable earnings, see Ontario FLA, supra
note 1, s 4(2)7 (“unadjusted pensionable earnings under the Canada
Pension Plan”). Other provinces’ legislation will include all
pensionable earnings (see e.g. British Columbia FLA, supra note 8,
s 84(2)(e); Yukon FPSA, supra note 16, ss 4(e)–(f).
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in their personal capacity. They are not shared because
what they represent—what they seek to “replace”—could
not be shared in a mass of assets. One need only think of
the loss of a limb or loss of enjoyment due to a trauma. As
put by McKinlay J. in Mittler v. Mittler: “[t]he purpose can
only be to permit spouses to retain for their own purposes
property which is completely personal to them, and to
which they are entitled for the purpose of replacing some
aspect of their enjoyment of life which cannot be truly
shared with any other individual, no matter how close the
relationship.” 78 A distinction is drawn between “general
damages for pain and suffering together with any special
damages that can be attributed directly to the personal
injury, as opposed to lost income or other loss to the
family.” 79 The rationale behind the exclusion of general
damages for a personal injury cannot be transposed to that
of gifts and inheritances because these do not “replace
some aspect of [the recipient’s] enjoyment of life” that
cannot be truly shared with a spouse. If stretched, the
comparison could apply to the bequest from a close relative
of an item bearing very personal memories, but it could not
be applied to any gift from a live third party. The rationale
for excluding gifts and inheritances must then be sought
elsewhere.
The exclusion of unadjusted pensionable earnings
from the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) from Ontario’s
Family Law Act can be explained on jurisdictional grounds.
CPP credit-splitting is already rendered mandatory as of
1987 by article 55.1 of the Canada Pension Plan, which
78

(1988), 17 RFL (3d) 113 at para 72, 12 ACWS (3d) 125 (Ont HC).

79

Hunks v Hunks, 2017 ONCA 247 at para 27, 97 RFL (7th) 89.
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provides that “in the case of spouses, following a judgment
granting a divorce or a judgment of nullity of the marriage,
[a division of unadjusted pensionable earnings shall take
place] on the Minister’s being informed of the judgment
and receiving the prescribed information”.80 The exclusion
of the proceeds of life insurance follows from that of
inheritances, as they are funds received upon the death of
an individual, predestined to a specific beneficiary. These
two exclusions therefore shed no light on the motives
behind the exclusion of gifts and inheritances.
Second, it might be argued that all subsection 4(2)
types of property are excluded simply because they do not
respond to the chief criterion for what makes a shared asset;
that is, one that is created by the joint efforts of the spouses.
This is the explanation given by the Ontario and Quebec
commentators. This explanation seems appealing, but as
we have just seen, it does not apply to all the exclusions.
Moreover, when applied to gifts and inheritances, it results
from a generalization about the circumstances that give rise
to these transfers. Yet, it is easy enough to consider a
hypothetical situation where the efforts of a spouse
permitted the other spouse to dedicate more time and
energy to the care of an elderly or ailing relative, friend, or
neighbour, who later thanked them with a gift or
inheritance. This joint effort goes unrecognized under the
current laws. As to the increase in value of gifted or
inherited property during a marriage, the Ontario and
Quebec legislators themselves recognized that the joint
efforts of spouses are likely its cause; yet, they can easily
be put aside by the clear intention of a donor or testator.
80

Canada Pension Plan, RSC 1985, c C-8, s 55.1(a). See also Payne v
Payne (1988), 16 RFL (3d) 8 at para 10, 11 ACWS (3d) 174 (Ont HC).
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It is clear that the joint efforts of spouses are not
completely antithetical to the reception or increase in value
of gifts and inheritances, but they are afterthoughts at
best—when their presence is not completely dismissed by
the legal provisions in place. Indeed, the legislature has
placed the joint efforts of the spouses second to the
intention of the testator or donor in cases where both
spouses may be to thank for the actions that prompted the
transfer or the increase in value of the property. This
translates a presumption that in most cases gifts and
inheritances have nothing to do with the joint efforts of the
spouses. Our article now turns this presumption on its head
and asks: if gifts and inheritances are not the result of the
joint efforts of the spouses, what are they? Are they the
result of individual endeavour? Are they so closely tied to
an individual in their personal capacity that they are
considered an extension of their being (as are damages for
personal injury)? Through our exploration of the historical
treatments of gifts and inheritances, we find that the answer
lies between these possibilities: gifts and inheritances are
treated as unrelated to the joint efforts of spouses because
they are used as a protective mechanism for the bloodline’s
property. This answer in turn leads us to question the
exclusion altogether.
II. GIFTS, INHERITANCES, AND THE FAMILY IN
HISTORY
As we have seen, gifts and inheritances are, according to
the dominant commentary, not a result of the joint efforts
of the spouses. While gifts are perceived by some
commentators as the result of labour in a long-term
relationship, or as a transaction within a series of market-
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type exchanges,81 this transactional type of analysis is not
compatible with the matrimonial regimes’ exclusion of
gifts and inheritances, which do include the fruits of labour
of each spouse in their joint mass of assets. If gifts and
inheritances cannot be defined, for the purposes of current
matrimonial regimes, as born from the labour of either
spouse nor of that of the couple, then they must arise from
the relationship that links the donor or testator and the
recipient. There are multiple ways that married couples can
interact with gifts and inheritances: they can be the
recipients of these liberalities, or they can be the donors or
testators (and as such, they can select their spouse or a third
party as a recipient). This Part will look at the way spouses’
ability to interact with gifted or inherited property has been
restricted at various points in Roman, civil, and common
law (Part II-A) and argue that these restrictions all share a
common purpose: the desire to maintain the bequeathed
property within the family, conceived as a bloodline
(Part II-B).
A. Gifts, Inheritances, and the Married Couple
The exclusionary provisions we have analyzed thus far
created a clear distinction between gifts made to a spouse
by a third party, and gifts made to the spouse by the other
spouse. In focusing on the former, they make no
restrictions on spouses’ ability to make gifts to one another,
or to make gifts to third parties. At various points in the
past, however, family and succession law have restricted
gratuitous transactions between the spouses’ families by
limiting gift-giving and testamentary freedom in these
81

See Dagan & Frantz, supra note 64 at 219. See also Hyland, supra
note 74 at 20–21.
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three different types of interactions—which we will
analyze in turn (Parts II-A-1 to II-A-3), although we will
see that the structure of property law also contains certain
rules intending to have the same effect (Part II-A-4).
1. Gifts and Inheritances from Third Parties
Canadian legislation on family property specifically
excludes gifts and inheritances made by a third party. 82
This includes gifts or inheritances bequeathed by the
spouses’ relatives, by friends, or by strangers, but excludes
gifts or inheritances bequeathed by one of the spouses
(whether to the other spouse or to a third party). Although
the notion of third-party donor or testator is broad, it seems
that the relationship most often envisaged is that of an
ascendant83 transferring property to their descendant.
The Civil Code of Québec’s predecessor was more
precise in discussing gifts made by third parties and
incorporated both rules applicable solely to gifts made by
an ascendant to a descendant, and rules for other third
parties. Article 1276 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada
specified that gifts and inheritances composed of
immoveable property made by ascendants of one of the
spouses to either one of the spouses, or to both spouses,
were deemed to have been made only to the donor’s
82

See Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2)(1); British Columbia FLA, supra
note 8, s 85(1)(b.1); Family Law Act, RSA 2003, c F-4.5, s 7(2)(a);
arts 415 al 4, 450(2) CCQ; Droit de la famille – 1463, [1991] RJQ
2514, [1991] RDF 698 (CA).

83

See Kouri et al, supra note 44, sub verbo “ascendant”
(“(Pers.) Progenitor of a person. For ex., mother, father,
grandparent”).
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presumptive heir—whether the deed listed them, their
spouse, or the couple as a recipient. As such, an
immoveable (a house or a parcel of land, for instance)
received by either one of the spouses or by the couple from
the ascendant of one of them would presumptively belong
to the spouse meant to inherit it. This presumption was
subject to the exception of an explicit declaration by the
donor or testator that they wished to do otherwise and grant
the title to the spouse of their presumptive heir or the
couple. Article 1276 further added that immoveables gifted
to or inherited by either spouse or by the couple from any
individual whom they were not descendants of would be
treated in the opposite way and enter the community
without exception. As such, the Civil Code of Lower
Canada’s default disposition was to include all gifts and
inheritances received from individuals unrelated to the
couple into their joint mass of assets (the opposite of our
current statutes’ approach), and exclude those gifts and
inheritances made by ascendants of the spouses, taking
special care to place them within the individual mass of
assets of the descendant—not necessarily that of the
intended recipient—by disregarding the name on the deed
if need be or if insufficiently clear. The article thus stated
a clear presumption in favour of the ascendant-descendant
relationship. While today’s exclusions in the Civil Code of
Québec have extended the definition of excluded gifts and
inheritances to moveables as well as immoveables (perhaps
as an acknowledgement that family wealth is decreasingly
tied to land) and to gifts and inheritances by strangers as
well as those by ascendants (perhaps conceding that
families fit less and less in traditional moulds), the spectre
of the family land and family house remain the historical
backdrop for such exclusions, and the examples discussed
by both common law and civil law authors and legislators
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remain tied to the family and to transfers from ascendants
to the spouses.84
The Civil Code of Lower Canada’s differentiation
of gifts and inheritances from ascendants, and those from
nonascendants, accords with the view that gifts and
inheritances are excluded because of the relationship
between the donor or testator and the recipient, rather than
because of the labour expended to acquire the gift. A third
party external to the family was not understood to have a
bond strong enough with the recipient to justify the gift or
inheritance, so this transfer must have been justified by
actions, and should be incorporated into the community.
Even today, the exclusion must be justified by a family-like
relationship; though today’s law incorporates a more
inclusive and broader notion of these relationships.
2. Gifts and Inheritances between Spouses
Today’s inclusion of gifts between spouses in the shared
mass of assets is justified by the concern that excluding
such transfers would allow spouses to bypass the default
matrimonial regimes by allowing them to exclude property
from the shared mass of assets indirectly. 85 In the past,
84

See e.g. Robert M Halpern, ed, Property Rights and Obligations under
Ontario Family Law (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2002) at 494–96;
Heakes, supra note 73 at 169, n 1 (“[t]he Gifting of real estate from
parents to their children [is] the classical form of intergenerational
family wealth distribution because of land’s historical position as the
almost exclusive store of economic value in ancient society”).

85

In the civil law, interspousal gifts are included in the shared mass of
assets through the family patrimony (see Tétrault, supra note 2 at 227–
28; Castelli & Goubau, supra note 54 at 131; Droit de la famille –
1463, supra note 82). In most statutes equivalent to Ontario’s Family
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interspousal gifts have played different roles: at common
law, gifts between spouses were impossible until wives
became legally capable of holding and transferring
property; gifts from a husband to his wife were void, and
wives had no property to transfer. 86 A similar limitation
existed in some northern regions of France during the
Ancien Régime, based not on technical limitations of legal
capacity, but rather on a clear desire to keep the property
of the wife’s family and that of the husband’s separate.87

Law Act, only gifts and inheritances from third persons are excluded
from the shared mass of assets—interspousal gifts are thus included.
See e.g. Ontario FLA, supra note 1, s 4(2)(1); British Columbia FLA,
supra note 8, s 85(1)(b.1). Inheritances between spouses pose a
different problem, unrelated to their potential inclusion in the shared
mass of assets (as the inheritance would only come to be once the core
of assets has ceased to exist due to the death of one spouse). Rather,
interspousal inheritances create a problematic overlap between the
recipient’s shared mass of assets and the inheritance that the recipient
receives from the deceased spouse.
86

See Hyland, supra note 74 at para 554. Note that an exception was
possible: a husband could make a gift to the wife’s dower.

87

See ibid at para 546 [footnotes omitted]:
Because, at the time, a wife was not considered part of
her husband’s family and did not inherit from him, the
goal of the prohibition seems to have been to prevent
property from passing between unrelated families.
Successions law was based on lineage. The customary
maxim was paterna paternis, materna maternis—the
father’s property was to descend to the father’s kin and
the mother’s to the mother’s. The marriage bed, as Le
Roy Ladurie wrote, was simply a piece of furniture.
The customs smiled on children, not on love.
See also Billette, supra note 37 (“[l]’ancien droit qui ne négligeait pas
les occasions de protéger les biens de famille et de les conserver dans
la branche d’où ils venaient, ne manqua pas . . . [d’adopter la
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This was the case of the Coutume de Paris, adopted in
Quebec in 1664, and carried on to the Civil Code of Lower
Canada.88 Other regions allowed such gifts but considered
them revocable until the death of the donating spouse. The
rest of France also embraced this latter practice when the
Code civil des Français was adopted in 1804, and the
“conservation of property within the families became a
principle to be fought.”89
The prohibition on interspousal gifts in civilian
systems was itself inherited from Roman law.90 Women
married under Roman law could enter one of two kinds of
marriage: cum manu (a matrimonial regime in which their
legal status was tied to that of their husband) or sine manu
(in which their legal status remained tied to their father).
The question of interspousal gifts was moot for wives
married cum manu, as they were subsumed under their
husband’s power (potestas) and could not own property on
their own until their husband’s death. However, it became
increasingly relevant as marriages sine manu became more
prohibition des donations entre époux], non seulement pour les
donations, mais aussi pour les testaments” at 179).
88

See Zoltvany, supra note 12 at 369; Gilles, supra note 36 at 121;
arts 770, 1265 CCLC; Burman, supra note 57 at 157. See also Billette,
supra note 37 at 179 (stating that this rule was also extended to
testamentary gifts between spouses). But see Castelli, supra note 38
at 416 (arguing that the prohibition of interspousal gifts was not due to
a desire to maintain the property of the bloodlines separate, but to
protect the spouses from being tied to a gift made in an instant of
passion or under undue pressure from the other spouse).

89

Billette, supra note 37 at 179 [translated by author]. See also art 1096
CcF; Hyland, supra note 74 at para 547.

90

See Billette, supra note 37 at 179.
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prevalent (towards the end of the Roman Republic). 91
Wives married sine manu became legally independent (sui
juris) at the death of their father or the patriarch of their
family (paterfamilias). Thus, they could own, transfer, and
receive property while married. In such a marriage, normal
gifts (dona) would be conceivable between spouses but
would be subject to an absolute prohibition. 92 While no
clear justification exists for this prohibition,93 its effect was
clearly to keep the property of each spouse’s bloodline
separate.94
3. Gifts and Inheritances to Third Parties
Today’s Canadian common and civil laws do not restrict
spouses’ ability to make gifts or select heirs (outside of
some specific provisions meant to ensure that a spouse
does not waste the family property before a separation in
order to avoid its equal or fair partition). 95 In contrast,
many civilian jurisdictions maintain a regime of forced
91

See Hyland, supra note 74 at paras 541–42.

92

See ibid; John P Dawson, Gifts and Promises: Continental and
American Law Compared (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980)
at 14–15.

93

See Hyland, supra note 74 at para 543, listing many possible
justifications for the prohibition but noting that “none of the
justifications was convincing, even when considered from the point of
view of the Roman jurists.”

94

This is the justification that John Dawson prefers: “There must have
been another reason: much more concern than the surviving sources
show over the diversion of assets from one family line to another,
enriching the family of the acquisitive spouse” (Dawson, supra note 92
at 14).

95

See e.g. arts 422, 471 CCQ.
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heirship inherited from Roman law, which mandates that
the heirs of the deceased necessarily inherit a specific share
of the estate. 96 Such regimes are meant to “protect[] the
heirs against the alienation of family resources”97 and are
arguably working from a presumption that the property in
question does not belong to the individual entirely, but is
meant to belong to the family. The family is conceived as
a bloodline (the intended heirs are the children), whose
interests supersede those of the testator in such a case. In
Quebec, three types of restrictions upon a spouse’s ability
to make gifts or bequeath property to third parties outside
the bloodline were inherited from the Ancien Régime and
are clearly meant to protect the property of the bloodline:
the réserve coutumière, the légitime, and the édit de
secondes noces. There are no equivalents for these
restrictions in the common law.
Quebec inherited the réserve coutumière from
French law, where it had evolved in the middle ages—
though, per J.-Émile Billette, it was “a tradition that went
back to the furthest eras of civilization.” 98 The réserve
coutumière, which has now fused with the légitime to
96

See Hyland, supra note 74 (“[i]f the decedent has made gratuitous
transfers in excess of the disposable share, bequests are reduced, and,
if that reduction proves insufficient, inter vivos gifts too are recalled”
at para 1343). France, for instance, maintains a “réserve héréditaire”
(art 912 C civ).

97

Hyland, supra note 74 at para 1343. See also Germain Brière,
Donations, substitutions et fiducie (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1988)
at 9 (suggesting that gifts are dangerous because they can reduce the
property that will be left to heirs, and that restrictions upon an
individual’s ability to make gifts indirectly protects that individual’s
family).

98

Billette, supra note 37 at 85 [translated by author].
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create the réserve héréditaire in French law, was set aside
in 1774 in Quebec.99 The réserve coutumière consisted of
four fifths of an individual’s estate, which were to be
inherited by their kin. If the property left in the deceased’s
estate after all bequests had been subtracted was
insufficient to cover the réserve coutumière, gifts and
legacies to third parties would be reduced to satisfy it.100
The purpose behind these provisions was clearly the desire
to maintain property within the family, which was
conceived of as kinship.101
The légitime, originating from Roman law,
reflected a moral obligation that the deceased owed to their
descendants. 102 The légitime was calculated from the
property that the deceased had left ab intestate and that was
disposed of by gift or legacy. If the estate was insufficient
to cover the minimum amount owed as the légitime,
descendants could recall legacies as well as gifts made
during the lifetime of the deceased in order to satisfy the
légitime.103 Both the légitime and the réserve coutumière
had a conception of the family centred on blood ties and
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Ordonnances de dernière volonté (UK), 41 Geo III, c 4.

MARRIED COUPLE, SINGLE RECIPIENT

35

aimed at maintaining the property inherited within that
family.104
The concern about maintaining property within
bloodlines is particularly salient in the context of the third
restriction inherited from the Coutume de Paris: the édit de
secondes noces (the “édit”). The édit originated in Roman
law and was imported into French law by statute in 1560.
As its name suggests, this restriction upon testamentary
freedom was concerned with spouses (in particular,
widows) entering a second marriage. The édit’s focus was
on ensuring that the property inherited from the deceased
spouse not be transferred to the new spouse’s family, but
that it be inherited (for the most part) by the children of the
first marriage. 105 The restriction intended that, upon the
death of their remarried parent, the children of the first
marriage would receive as large a part of this parent’s
estate as that awarded to any individual from their parent’s
new family. 106 It also prohibited spouses who remarried
from transferring the property of their deceased spouse to
their new spouse by gift or bequest and from alienating this
property to the detriment of the children from their first
marriage. 107 Thus, the édit increased the likelihood that
property would be inherited by the children of the first
104
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marriage, rather than be transferred into a different
bloodline.
These practices limiting individuals’ ability to
make gifts and bequests were eventually abolished in
Quebec due to their incompatibility with the principle of
testamentary freedom, which, as a result of the common
law’s influence in Quebec, was a major element of the
reform of Quebec’s civil law when the Civil Code of Lower
Canada was drafted. 108 The historical importance of
freedom of testation in the common law explains the
absence of such dispositions in common law Canada.
4. Property Law and the Bloodline’s Inherited Lands
The ramifications of the exclusionary logic of the bloodline
family and of the importance of maintaining property
(especially real property rather than its equivalent value)
within the bloodline can be gleaned in other aspects of
property law in both Quebec and the common law
provinces. Until 1855, for instance, through the right of
retrait lignager (the “retrait”), an individual whose family
member had sold an immoveable family asset to a third
party was able—as of right—to intervene in the transaction
within a year and a day after its completion to reclaim that
property (by reimbursing its purchaser).109 This right was
only applicable to immoveables that had been owned by a
spouse before their marriage or that they had inherited from
an ascendant during the marriage.110 Although the retrait
108
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was rarely executed,111 its existence is a clear indication of
the great importance attached to the link between the
family and its property by French law, which was imported
into Quebec with the Coutume de Paris. This was
eloquently noted by Maximilien Bibaud in objecting to its
abolition:
Le retrait lignager était fondé sur la raison du
sang et n’était établi que pour conserver dans
les familles les héritages, qui en sont le relief
et qui forment une partie des marques de leur
ancienneté, comme l’observe notre feudiste
canadien Cugnet. Mais nous sommes
aujourd’hui sous un gouvernement tout
différent de celui qui avait implanté en
Canada toutes les vieilles institutions
françaises. Bien loin de se montrer jaloux de
conserver les biens dans les familles, il a
voulu qu’on pût déshériter ses enfants sans
raison en faveur d’un étranger, sans que ces
héritiers naturels pussent proférer la moindre
plainte. . . . Le retrait se trouve directement
contraire au génie de nos compatriotes anglo
saxons, qui les porte à éloigner tout obstacle
à l’expédition assurée des affaires et des
transactions, et un Anglais qui achète
s’imagine bien devenir le propriétaire
incommutable du fonds qu’il acquiert.112
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With the retrait lignager, even the sale of property was
thus confined to narrower limits in the interests of keeping
property within the family bloodline.
As pointed out by Bibaud, no similar right existed
to protect heirs in the common law.113 Yet, looking at the
kinds of interests granted to wives and husbands in
inherited property shows that this system was also
structured in a manner that promoted the retention of
inherited property within the bloodline, despite wives’
incapacity to hold property. In Canadian common law
jurisdictions, as long as wives had no legal status, they
could not own personal property. Under the default regime
(without entering into a prenuptial agreement or being the
beneficiary of a trust) wives “w[ere] seised [of their
freeholds], becoming entitled [instead] to their use and to
rents and profits.” 114 A wife was no longer capable of
disposing of the land without her husband’s consent,
whereas he could dispose of it to the extent of his own
interest, which was limited by curtesy if the wife had a
child.115 If the wife died, the husband would thus have a
life estate in the land; 116 if the husband predeceased the
wife, she would recover her rights over the land.
Personalty, on the other hand, would pass to the husband
upon marriage and he could dispose of it absolutely. Thus,
while personal property would be lost to the wife upon
marriage, there seemed to be a concern to keep real
property in the hands of the wife if she outlived her
113
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husband and if the land had been gifted to her or inherited
by her, as opposed to her husband, or to ensure that her
descendants inherited the land if she predeceased him. This
concern cannot simply be attributed to a desire to secure
housing and provide for the wife’s basic needs once she
became a widow, as the mechanism of dower was meant to
serve this purpose. 117 Rather, it might hint at a desire to
maintain a link between the wife and her inherited or gifted
property, with the husband’s life interest being a necessary
element to ensure the land could be managed during their
marriage. Once wives were granted legal personality in the
common law, spouses lived in a de facto separate property
regime: each continued owning the property they had
accumulated before marriage, and each held titles to the
property they received during the marriage. There was no
mass of shared assets from which to exclude gifts and
inheritances.
B. Historically, Restrictions on Gift Giving and
Testamentary Freedom Protected the Bloodline’s
Property
While the notion of joint efforts and partnership in a
marriage is relatively new (as is that of equality between
the spouses), the exclusion of gifts, inheritances, or
property otherwise perceived as belonging to a bloodline
from a common mass of assets to be divided upon the
separation of the spouses (through divorce, death, or other
types of circumstances) has been around since Roman Law
at least. As we have seen, many types of provisions have
117
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attempted to keep this type of property within the family,
perceived as a bloodline, including: the réserve
coutumière, the légitime, the édit de secondes noces, the
prohibition of gifts between spouses, and the relabeling of
gifts to a spouse when they are descendants of the donor or
testator. The exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the
common mass of assets to be divided upon a couple’s
separation fits with the evolution of this framework and is
arguably the newest iteration of the desire to maintain the
property within the family-as-bloodline. The exclusion in
today’s matrimonial regimes shares with the Civil Code of
Lower Canada’s provisions on the relabeling of gifts or
inheritances to a descendent spouse the fact that, although
mandatory, it is not a prohibition: there are clearly laid out
ways to bypass it. This can be done by the donor or testator
if they are clear in their intent to make the gift to both
spouses, or by the recipient if they spend, invest, or
repurpose the gift or inheritance in such a way as to make
it enter the joint mass of assets.118 A prenuptial or divorce
agreement can also vary these rules, and allow the spouses
to share the value of the gifted or inherited property. 119 In
this sense, the exclusion of gifts and inheritances found in
current matrimonial regimes is following the trend of
protecting the property of the bloodline by preventing the
spouse who married into the bloodline from sharing this
property when the marriage ends. However, current
matrimonial regimes are also infused with a greater interest
in the will of the spouse or spouses and respect for the will
of the testator or donor.
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The exclusion of gifts and inheritances is a logical
fit in Quebec civil law, given the tenuous relationship
between French civil law and liberalities. Although
freedom of testation had done away with much of the
legislation restricting bequests, the mistrust towards these
sorts of transactions—the sense that they do not quite fit
within the structure of private law, that they are a danger to
the family120—remains in the structure of the civil law, and
most likely in the minds of legislators and judges. While
the common law has done less to outlaw gratuitous
transactions within the family, likely due to its more
pronounced belief in freedom of testation, its historical
reluctance to accommodate gratuitous transactions
certainly suggests that, in seeking inspiration from the civil
law’s regime for family property law, this exclusion
seemed like a logical fit. The fact that the exclusion is one
of the most consistent aspects of Canadian matrimonial
regimes is, consequently, not surprising and conveys a
message about the law’s current conception of families and
the individuals that compose them. The exclusion of gifts
and inheritances from the shared mass of assets has a
symbolic and communicative value as much as it does a
practical one. As such, we ought to consider whether this
exclusion has struck the right balance between the
promotion of autonomy and equality of the spouses,
freedom of testation, and the promotion of marriage as a
partnership.
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III. EXCLUDING GIFTS AND INHERITANCES
TODAY: PRIORITIZING BLOODLINE OVER
PARTNERSHIP?
The reforms to matrimonial regimes in Canada introduced
many new notions into both the civil and common law
traditions. While the regime of acquests was an old
structure imported from the Ancien Régime, it was a
revolutionary regime to introduce into the common law.
The family patrimony was just as revolutionary in the civil
law; there is still no equivalent to it in France or other civil
law jurisdictions. Contrasting with these innovations is the
exclusion of gifts and inheritances, an awkward fit that
imports the remnants of the old system into the new: the
maintenance of gifted and inherited property within the
bloodlines into a system that values partnership, equity,
sharing, and choice. The justification of this exclusion of
gifts and inheritances as not resulting from the joint efforts
of the couple rests on the traditional notion of the family as
bloodline. Thus, the current system sends messages that are
imprinted with this anachronism. Parts I and II of this
article analyzed in some depth the exclusion of gifts and
inheritances from matrimonial regimes and its origins.
Part III will now take a step back and focus on the
trajectory of the private law’s conception of the family by
using a framework presented by the works of Mireille
Castelli and Christine Morin in the context of the law of
successions (Part III-A). We will then transpose our
previous analysis of the exclusion of gifts and inheritances
into this framework (Part III-B) and find that the exclusion
of gifts and inheritances from the shared mass of assets is
indeed an outlier that should perhaps be addressed
(Part III-C).
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A. Succession Law and the Family: Shifting the
Balance between Blood, Individual, and Couple
In an analysis of succession law published in 1973, Mireille
Castelli put forward three conceptions of individuals’
relationships with their patrimony, which she used to study
the evolution of succession law in Quebec and France since
the Coutume de Paris. 121 Christine Morin, in a thesis
published in 2008, used this same framework to analyze
the evolution of succession law until recently. 122 Both
authors used this framework to study an individual’s
relationship to their property in the civil law through the
prism of the patrimony which is at the heart of the civilian
concept of property. However, the three conceptions of the
relationship between individual and property that they
describe can easily be transposed to the couple in both the
civil and common law. The three conceptions outlined by
Castelli are the those tied to the bloodline (conception
lignagère ou familiale, according to which the property
owned by an individual is also the subject of rights
belonging to members of the individual’s bloodline
family), the individual (conception personnelle, whereby
only the individual holds rights to their property), and the
couple (conception conjugale, which considers that the
property of an individual is in some ways “co-owned” and
meant to profit their spouse).123
The bloodline conception was the prevalent
framework in the Coutume de Paris, which had put in place
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multiple structures to ensure that property remain within
the bloodline family. 124 The personal conception is
reflected in the abolition of some restrictions on gift-giving
and inheritance law, such as the lifting of the prohibition of
interspousal bequests with the 1774 Quebec Act,125 which
Castelli attributes to the fact that that legislator no longer
feared the mixing of bloodlines’ property.126 According to
the author, this is an intermediary stage, where the family
remains more closely associated with the bloodline than the
couple or the marriage. The conjugal conception would
consider the spouse’s property as destined for the use of the
family, which is then conceived of as mainly the couple,
and to some extent their children.127 The conception of the
bloodline family needs to be shed in order for the conjugal
conception to take hold. 128 Castelli argues that the
emergence of the conjugal conception in Quebec is tied to
the great mobility of its population; as a result, husbands
often placed their wives in charge of their affairs and
property while they were away, and made them their
universal legatee. 129 Morin sees the conjugal conception
reflected most strongly in the reforms leading to the
124
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creation of the family patrimony: although the Civil Code
of Québec continues to conceive of the patrimony as
individual, “the Code confers a conjugal character to the
property that composes the family patrimony since their
value is divisible between the spouses at the end of their
union and the owner cannot oppose themselves to the
division.”130 The family patrimony accords with Castelli’s
conjugal conception since it takes the spouse in
consideration first and foremost, and while children may
benefit indirectly from the family patrimony they are not
its intended beneficiaries.
According to Castelli and Morin, the Coutume de
Paris therefore symbolically embodied the bloodline
conception through the instruments we have analyzed in
Part II-A, although in practice Quebeckers have always
been tied more closely to the individual conception. The
conjugal conception would also have roots that extend to
the beginning of the colony, although its growth has been
slower than that of the individual conception, and it has
only flowered with the creation of the family patrimony.
B. Excluding Gifts and Inheritances: Primacy of Blood
or Spouse’s Choice?
There is no doubt that the provisions from the Coutume de
Paris, Roman law, and the structure of property law in
common law studied in Part II-A, above, subscribe exactly
to what Castelli termed the conception lignagère, where
“spouses are . . . above all else, members of two different
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families with opposing interests.” 131 The notion of the
family as a bloodline suggests that we consider the family
in terms of ascendants and descendants, or the vertical
relations on a family tree, rather than the horizontal links
that connect spouses. The historical examples of
prohibitions of interspousal gifts (found in both civil and
common law) or the re-classification of a gift upon
separation in the Civil Code of Lower Canada clearly point
to a fear of letting the property of a bloodline fall into the
hands of another through marriage, and the prioritization
of the bloodline over the marriage (even at a time when the
most common reason for ending a marriage was death,
rather than separation or divorce).
The promise of equality that came with the
abolition of the husband’s overarching personality and
authority over the household, and that of the differential
duties of the spouses, brought with it the suggestion that
spouses be seen as individuals in marriage, that their
individual personality and rights not be affected by the fact
of marriage, nor their chance to an equal share in the
couples’ property upon divorce. With their own rights and
personality, spouses are perceived as individuals in society,
outside of the couple where before only the husband was
able to bind the family. The fact that spouses retain the
property they had before marriage in their individual mass
of assets is a testament to this focus on the individual, as is
matrimonial regimes’ unanimous decision to keep damages
for personal injury as part of individual masses of
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property. 132 Reforms first to succession law and then to
matrimonial regimes in Quebec and in the common law
have indeed, as Castelli and Morin suggest, done away
with many of the restrictions to gift giving and freedom of
testation, in a move that is suggestive of the individual or
personal conception put forward by Castelli. Where gifts
and inheritances are concerned, the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, the Civil Code of Québec, and the common law
have all made space over the past few decades for the will
of the spouses to override that of the donor and allow for
the mixing and transfer of property between the bloodlines
during and at the end of marriage.
Moreover, in putting forward a definition of
marriage that equates the couple with a partnership, our
current matrimonial regimes appear to be embracing the
conjugal conception: the notion of “partnership” values the
joint efforts of the two spouses and divides the property
between them under the assumption that the partners
desired it to be shared. The mandatory sharing of the family
patrimony, in particular, pushes this conception the
furthest. While we agree with Morin’s assertion that the
idea of the family patrimony truly embodies the conjugal
conception, 133 and indeed find that this conception is
present to some extent in all Canadian matrimonial
regimes, the content of the family patrimony and of the
shared mass of assets in the statutory regimes, in our
opinion, mitigates this conception.
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Even though spouses can transfer property between
bloodlines much more freely today than they could ever
before, a clear act is still required to transfer property from
a spouse’s individual mass of assets to the joint mass: the
default is still that which respects the separation of property
coming from bloodlines. Moreover, the current system
requires that to maintain their inherited or gifted property
as part of the individual mass of assets, a spouse must make
“selfish” choices in handling that property: if it is used to
benefit the couple or their children the gifted or inherited
property will join the shared mass of property. If it is
managed separately, it will remain in the recipient spouse’s
individual mass of assets. Thus, as far as this exclusion is
concerned, the family-as-bloodline remains the default
conception of the family, and the individual conception is
introduced only by the recipient’s clear choice. The
conjugal conception is only a side-effect of this choice; that
is, the property will only belong to the couple if an
individual choice is made by the spouse to spend it for that
purpose.
It strikes us that while the regimes prima facie put
forward a conception that matches a conjugal
understanding of the family and of spouses’ relationship
with their property, the exclusion of inherited and gifted
property from the shared mass of assets is an anachronism
that draws the spouse back to a bloodline conception of the
family. As stated by Castelli, “[i]t is thus that even some
institutions which, at first sight, would seem very
favourable to partners and in contradiction with our
affirmation, prove to be, in fact, deviations of old
institutions which tend towards a conception tied to
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bloodlines.” 134 We believe that the exclusion of
inheritances and gifts from the shared mass of assets in
current matrimonial regimes forms one of these institutions
which, although they seem at first glance in accordance
with the ethos of the matrimonial regimes, are remnants of
ancient institutions and carry with them the equally ancient
concept of family equated to bloodlines. In our opinion, the
presence of this anachronism undermines the importance
granted to both the individual conception (notions of
autonomy and choice) and the conjugal conception
(notions of equity and sharing) that are also embedded in
the matrimonial regimes.
C. Remnants of the Bloodline: Reconsidering the
Exclusion of Gifts and Inheritances
We return to a question asked at the outset of this article:
insofar as our matrimonial property regimes’ exclusion of
inheritances and gifts is the remnant of a conception that
equates the family with the spouse’s bloodline, do we find
that our legislation and its structure conceives of the couple
as a unit, as a set of individuals, or as the temporary joining
of two separate families? Moreover, if there is a
disconnection between the objective and the conception set
out by the regimes, and that embodied by the exclusion of
gifts and inheritances, what ought to be done to remedy it?
Our current regimes clearly state that they consider
the couple a form of partnership, and their property as the
result of their joint endeavours. The matrimonial regimes
and the Civil Code of Québec provide that spouses ought
to contribute equally to the partnership, in accordance with
134
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their means. 135 The definition is purposive: the spouses
contribute to the partnership and they have a common goal.
The way in which the shared masses of assets are populated
is also purposive: assets that are acquired while the couple
is married are presumed to be acquired to serve the family;
assets that would be part of the individual mass of property
but are spent on the family join the common mass of assets.
The purpose of the partnership is thus the wellbeing of the
family, as the family of choice, the couple, and, where
applicable, their descendants. In their daily lives, the
spouses retain their individuality in their activities, but the
purpose of these activities is centred on the family as a unit,
which is reflected in the deferred-sharing scheme.
Marriage under the default Canadian regimes thus sees the
couple as a hybrid between a set of individuals and a
nuclear family unit, the personal and the conjugal
conceptions. 136 The mandatory family patrimony of
Quebec, however, embodies a stronger notion of unity,
both symbolically due to its name, as well as practically
due to its mandatory nature. The term “patrimony” is the
name, in civil law, of the metaphorical container that each
person has and in which they carry the property they own.
The term has a close affiliation with the notion of
personality: each person has one and only one patrimony,
and each patrimony is associated with only one person.137
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The notion of family patrimony thus suggests that the Civil
Code of Québec looks at the family as it would a person.138
The exclusion of inheritances and gifts is all the more
jarring in the current context, because it speaks to a
conception of the couple not as a set of individuals or a
unit, but as a pair of separate families joining for period of
time, while attempting to keep their property separate.
Let us return to a comment by Castelli: “[r]eleasing
the patrimony from the shackles of the conception of
bloodlines and its causes . . . is the most essential step
towards admitting the partner into the family.”139 Could we
argue that the exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the
shared mass of assets is one such obstruction which
prevents the spouses from fully entering one another’s
families—or the family which they create together?
If the exclusion of gifts and inheritances is a
remnant of a conception of the family that our matrimonial
legislation has shed in the pursuit of granting greater
freedom of testation and equality regardless of gender—as
we have argued that it is—we might indeed wonder
whether excluding gifts and inheritances in today’s
regimes is still desirable. On the one hand, we might
consider that gifts and inheritances are often the marker of
a symbolic and emotional attachment between an
individual and a lost loved one. 140 Would it be fair to
138
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require that a divorcing spouse have to potentially separate
from the last tangible memory they have of a parent, just as
the family they have created together with their spouse is
disintegrating? Might we wish to draw a distinction
between gifts and inheritances that are likely to hold
significant monetary value rather than emotional? 141 On
the other hand, our understanding of what “family” means
evolves with our society, and is increasingly inclusive:
marriage no longer takes account of sex or gender; de facto
spouses are treated as spouses whose relationship has been
formalized for the purposes of most legislation on family
law outside of Quebec; rules on filiation are increasingly
inclusive across the country; and kinship and ties created
otherwise than by blood are playing a growing role in
legacies.142 In such a context, do we want to maintain an
exclusion which, while attempting to keep the memory of
a deceased loved one alive by keeping aside and intact the
property they have left a spouse,143 perpetuates the notion
that blood is the basis for defining families?
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CONCLUSION
Current matrimonial regimes are the result of an attempt to
infuse matrimonial law with substantive, rather than
formal, equality among spouses upon their divorce or
separation. The introduction of divorce in federal
legislation, followed by high-profile cases showcasing the
unequal and unfair results of contemporary matrimonial
regimes, have led to multiple reforms of the default
matrimonial regimes in all Canadian provinces and
territories, constructed around the idea of marriage as an
economic partnership. In the context of these reforms, the
exclusion of gifts and inheritances has been justified on the
basis that such property is not born from the common
efforts of the spouses. Our analysis of the tenuous
relationship gifts and inheritances entertain with married
couples has endeavoured to show that if these gratuitous
transactions cannot be justified by the spouses’ efforts, it is
because private law has repeatedly considered them in the
context of transfers from ascendants to descendants and has
consistently raised obstacles to gratuitous transactions
outside of this relationship.
Our analysis has focused on the married couple,
which, according to our current matrimonial regimes, is a
partnership of joint endeavours that carries with it a sense
of equity and sharing, and a common goal—the wellbeing
of the family. Yet, our regimes still exclude gifts and
inheritances made to only one spouse, the single recipient:
when it comes to gifts and inheritances, the regimes forget
the marriage and turn to old habits and conceptions; the
spouse is no longer a half of a couple, or even a single
individual, but a family member belonging to a bloodline,
the property of which is to be protected. In our view, this
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exclusion of gifts and inheritances from the shared mass of
assets of married couples is the symbol of an outdated
conception of marriage and the family, a remnant that
should lead us to question how we understand what
constitutes a family and how we can foster equality, equity,
and solidarity within that framework.

